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Summary
This report analyzes the prospects for rebuilding an inclusive Iraqi security force
that transcends Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian communities. U.S. policy makers and
Iraqi officials aim to create a unified Iraqi security force; however, the predominately
Sunni Arab insurgency has hampered this effort, and many believe that the new Iraqi
security agencies will ultimately be composed of mostly Shiite and Kurdish recruits with
both communities separately maintaining their own militias.  As Iraqi officials attempt
to build a pluralistic political system, an important challenge will be rebuilding an
inclusive Iraqi security force that does not exacerbate relations between Iraq’s
ethnic/religious communities and increase the likelihood of civil war. For more
information on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and
Post-Saddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman and CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s
Influence in Iraq, by Jeremy M. Sharp. This report will be updated periodically. 
Introduction
The Bush Administration has deemed the rapid creation of an effective Iraqi fighting
force as key to stabilizing Iraq and expediting the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. The
rationale for this effort is that a well-trained, well-equipped Iraqi army can be effective
in quelling the insurgency and can help smooth the process of restoring full sovereignty
to a new Iraqi government. U.S. policy makers envision the new Iraqi security forces (ISF)
to be representative of Iraqi society at large.  A goal is for the new Iraqi army and police
to transcend Iraq’s religious and ethnic boundaries and keep the country unified while
fighting an insurgency. 
However, there is concern that the ethnic-sectarian nature of the burgeoning
insurgency is undermining U.S. and Iraqi efforts to create a unified Iraqi security force
that can prevent internal insurgent violence from metastasizing into a larger Iraqi civil war
among Sunnis and Iraqi Shiites and Kurds. With violence unabated in Baghdad and Iraq’s
three main Sunni provinces, there has been considerable emphasis on recruiting, training,
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and equipping Iraqi soldiers and policemen, but substantially less attention to the future
ethnic/religious makeup of various Iraqi security entities. 
Background
Since its creation at the hands of the British in 1921, the Iraqi army has  never been
able to effectively integrate the country’s Arabs and Kurds, as the army has traditionally
been a strong institution and a source of pride among many Iraqi Sunni and some Shiite
Arabs. Sunni Arab officers, who had served in both the Ottoman Empire and the Arab
revolt against that empire in World War I, formed the core of the nascent army, which was
primarily designed to be an internal security force with little or no ability to project power
beyond Iraq’s borders. During the British mandate (1920-1932), the British effectively
controlled the Iraqi army, but curbed its expansion by relying on British air power and an
ethnically/religiously-based unit known as the Assyrian levies, which was controlled by
the Ministry of the Interior and was used as a bulwark against Turkish meddling in the
north and as a counter-insurgency force against rebellious segments of Iraqi society such
as the Shiites and Kurds. 
After Iraq obtained full independence in 1932, its Sunni army officers became
outwardly more politicized, culminating in the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 by
Major General Abdul-Karim Qassim. Sunnis continued to dominate the officer corps of
the Iraqi army and, by the early 1960s, Sunnis composed 70% of all officers in the Iraqi
army (of whom 45% hailed from Mosul), with Shiites making up 20% and Kurds and
other minorities 10%.1 Relations between Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish officers were tense,
due to repeated Kurdish revolts in northern Iraq and institutional discrimination against
Shiites within the army.  
Saddam Hussein, who himself had no formal military training, purged the army of
anyone considered to be a potential threat to him and to the Baath party.  He created a
number of overlapping security agencies and filled them with members of his immediate
family and larger tribe. Saddam largely ignored the regular Iraqi army, with the exception
of the elite Republican Guard units,  as power within his regime was based largely on his
special security agencies which kept close tabs on Iraqi officers. Saddam continued the
practice of relegating Shiites to low level positions and to conscripts within the regular
army. Shiites took a disproportionate amount of casualties on the front lines of the Iran-
Iraq War in the 1980’s. Ultimately, like other ruthless dictators, Saddam’s preference for
loyal internal security forces and elite military units succeeded in preventing regular army
units from attempting to overthrow the regime. 
Disbanding the Iraqi Army.  Historians will most likely continue to debate the
U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army in May 2003. Many critics point to that decision
(Order #2 -Dissolution of Entities) as the single most important factor in destabilizing Iraq
after the cessation of large scale military operations. Although observers expected U.S.
officials to prohibit the upper echelon of Saddam’s security forces from rejoining the
army, the initial decision to exclude regular army officers and conscripts surprised many
analysts who had argued for the Administration to distinguish between Saddam’s
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privileged inner core and the largely neglected regular army.   Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer III, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), defended the
policy, noting the role the decree had in reassuring the Kurds that the CPA was serious
about creating a united Iraq and convincing them not to secede.2
Current U.S. Training Efforts
U.S. policy has been focused on rapidly preparing Iraqi forces to take over security
responsibilities in order to expedite the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. The Multi-
National Security Training Command - Iraq (MNSTC) has been charged with training
Iraqi security personnel. MNSTC is headed by Army Lieutenant General Martin E.
Dempsey, who succeeded General David H. Petraeus in September 2005. During his tour,
General Petraeus was credited with implementing a more realistic assessment of Iraqi
troop readiness, embedding U.S. advisors with Iraqi units, and shifting more of the
military’s resources toward training. Nevertheless, critics charge that U.S. training efforts
are hampered by a shortage of U.S. trainers and Arabic translators, corruption inside
various Iraqi ministries, and regional and ethnic divisions inside the Iraqi Security Forces.
Prospects for a Unified Iraqi Army
As stated earlier, the effort to create a unified Iraqi security force mirrors and
depends on Iraqi politicians’ efforts to create a pluralistic political system that is
representative of all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities. While no exact
breakdown of Iraqi recruits by religious/ethnic group has been cited in public sources,
U.S. commanders have sought to create a security force that is roughly proportional to
Iraq’s various sectarian communities. The Sunni-character of the insurgency has hindered
efforts both at the political and military levels, though some analysts caution against
describing the situation as a burgeoning civil war.  Other analysts believe that while the
numerical strength of the Sunni insurgency may be small, the perception of a sectarian
civil war could become a reality unless Sunnis are integrated into the Iraqi security forces
in a significant way. 
Sunni Participation.  In 2005, U.S. and Iraqi officials increased their efforts to
recruit Sunnis into the ISF with limited success. After the January 30, 2005, transitional
parliamentary elections, some Sunni clerics issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling on
Sunni males to enlist in the ISF. According to General Petraeus, there was a major U.S.
effort to recruit Sunnis following the elections, which resulted in the recruitment of
“several thousand”  Sunnis with many of them joining the public order battalions of the
Ministry of Interior (MOI).3 
One of the most highly regarded Sunni units under the control of the MOI is a unit
of Special Police Commandos, a counter-insurgency force that has actively fought
alongside U.S. forces. The unit was formed in September 2004 by General Adnan Thabit,
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a 63-year-old Sunni and former intelligence officer in the Iraqi Air Force who was thrown
in prison for plotting a coup against Saddam Hussein in 1996. According to press reports,
the unit was initially formed without U.S. approval by Iraqi officials during the brief
tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.4  
The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD), which is led by Sadun al-Dulaymi, a Sunni,
also has made some progress in integrating Sunnis into its ranks. In November 2005, the
MOD announced that former Iraqi officers up to the rank of major are eligible for
reinstatement in the ISF. According to senior U.S. military officials, this process had
already been under way for some time and the decision would hopefully return more mid-
level officers to the Iraqi army.5 Officers from Saddam Hussein’s Special Republican
Guard units would still be banned from ISF participation. As of December 2005, the
Defense Ministry’s call for junior officers from the old army has drawn applications from
3,769 officers, with 2,662 of them accepted.6
Nevertheless, press reports from Sunni areas in Iraq indicate that there is still deep
mistrust among Sunni tribal elements toward coalition and Iraqi forces. Over the past few
months, several U.S. and Iraqi military commanders have conducted town hall meetings
in several Sunni provinces in order to convince tribal leaders to encourage their members
to join the ISF. Sunni Arabs have demanded that rather than working with existing ISF
units, they be allowed to raise their own tribal militias. Iraqi and U.S. leaders have so far
rejected such demands, as many analysts believe that tribal units from Sunni areas would
be too susceptible to insurgent infiltration. Sunni recruits to the ISF are viewed as traitors
by their fellow Sunnis, making it difficult to attract Sunni soldiers and police to the ISF.
In addition, continued attacks have further hampered efforts to recruit Sunnis into
the ISF. On January 5, 2006, 50 people were killed in a suicide bombing attack aimed at
an Iraqi police recruiting drive in the largely Sunni town of Ramadi, 70 miles west of
Baghdad. According to press reports, the police recruits were part of a contingent being
created for the Sunni province of Anbar. In 2005, the ISF police force in Ramadi
dissolved after Iraqi officers failed to show up for work after a number of insurgent
attacks against them. Sunni police forces also collapsed in Mosul and Fallujah during
clashes with insurgents in November 2004.
Growing Sunni-Shiite Tensions. It has been widely reported that Shiites make
up the bulk of the Interior Ministry forces (police) and much of the rank and file of the
regular armed forces. With a shortage of reliable Sunni soldiers to patrol Sunni provinces,
the U.S. and Iraqi governments have been forced to deploy mostly Shiite units to Sunni
towns, which has only exacerbated inter-communal tensions. For example, the Iraqi
army’s 7th Division, First Brigade, a mostly Shiite unit, is stationed outside of Ramadi.
During the recent December 2005 parliamentary elections, some Shiite soldiers had
posters bearing the image of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr stuck on their chests or
CRS-5
7 “Iraqi Official’s Visit to Sunni Province Underscores Depth of Distrust,” Washington Post,
December 13, 2005.  
8 The Wolf Brigade runs one of the most popular television shows in Iraq, “Terrorism in the
Hands of Justice,” which routinely airs confessions of insurgents in order to discredit their cause.
9 See CRS Report RS22323, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, updated November 30 ,2005, by Kenneth
Katzman. 
10 “Killings Linked To Shiite Squads In Iraqi Police Force,” Los Angeles Times, November 29,
2005. 
fastened to the end of raised AK-47 assault rifles.7 In the past, other units have displayed
pasted-up images of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani on the backs of their pickup trucks
while serving in Baghdad.
Sunni Distrust of Shiite Militias. However, more than anything else, ongoing
violence between Shiite militias and armed Sunni insurgent groups has led to further
ethnic and sectarian polarization. Although under CPA order #91 (June 2004), militias
independent of the Iraqi armed forces were declared illegal, in an effort to combat the
insurgency and increase the number of Iraqi forces serving in the field, Iraqi and U.S.
officials early on allowed some militias to operate in the field independent of the regular
Iraqi security forces, particularly to protect Shiite shrines. Since then, Shiite groups such
as the Badr Brigade (controlled by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq -
SCIRI) and the Mahdi Army (controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr) have contributed thousands
of recruits to the ISF and have served as a reliable source of manpower, particularly when
there was a major security vacuum brought on by the dissolution and disbandment of the
old Iraqi army in 2003. Nevertheless, many observers have questioned the loyalties of
militiamen to the central government in Baghdad. 
The Badr Brigade is distrusted by many Sunni Arabs due to its association with Iran
(Iran trained and equipped the brigade during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s). Sunnis
accuse the Badr Brigade of conducting reprisal killings against Sunni civilians. One well
known brigade in the ISF, the “Wolf Brigade,”8 has been singled out by Sunni critics for
their brutal tactics in targeting suspected terrorists and Sunni insurgents. The Badr
Brigade is believed to have contributed a number of soldiers to the Wolf Brigade, which
is under the control of the Iraqi Interior Ministry.9
Sunni condemnations of organized political violence by Shiite militias came to a
head in November 2005, when U.S. forces discovered a series of covert prisons in
Baghdad allegedly run Shiite ISF members loyal to the Badr Brigade. Investigators
uncovered evidence that prisoners, mostly Sunni Arabs, had been tortured at the
clandestine facilities. The Association of Muslim Scholars, a Sunni Arab religious group,
posted images of abused prisoners on its website in order to discredit the Badr Brigade.
The Mahdi Army, which took up arms against U.S. forces before integrating into the
Iraqi police, has reportedly formed police units called “the Punishment
Committees,”which harass civilians suspected of flouting Islamic law or their authority.
According to one U.S. military officer, “the Mahdi army’s got the Iraqi police and Badr’s
got the commandos...Everybody’s got their own death squads.”10 The Mahdi Army is
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reportedly strongest in the southern Shiite city of Basra, where it shares power with the
Badr Brigade and the ISF.
The blending of Shiite militias with many units under the control of the Iraqi Interior
Ministry has caused many Sunni Arabs to distrust Iraq’s police forces. Extrajudicial
killings and kidnappings are routinely carried out by militia members posing as police
officers, a similar tactic that Sunni insurgents have used to attack U.S. and Iraqi forces.
Since the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004, observers note that U.S. advisors
and trainers have worked more closely with Iraqi Ministry of Defense units, and there has
been less oversight of Iraqi police forces.11 
Kurds in the ISF. Many analysts have questioned whether, over the long run, the
ISF can successfully integrate Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. Since the start of U.S. efforts to
rebuild the Iraqi army, the combination of the Sunni character of the insurgency in
conjunction with the poorer quality of the Sunni and Shiite recruits forced U.S. and Iraqi
officials to rely heavily on the Kurdish components of the security forces. According to
U.S. military officials, Kurdish soldiers, due to the strength and experience of their
militias or peshmerga, are better trained and more highly committed than other Iraqi
recruits. 
Many observers question whether Kurds can ultimately be fully integrated into the
Iraqi security forces if Kurdish leaders insist on retaining their own militias.  Some
military analysts note that Kurdish recruits are more loyal to their tribal and political party
leaders than they are to the central government in Baghdad, calling into question the
viability of a single unified Iraqi army.  The combination of a long history of Kurdish-
Arab conflict, the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages between 1988-1990,
and Kurdish desires for autonomy may have produced a strong antipathy among Kurdish
politicians for a strong, centralized military force in Iraq.  According to Massoud Barzani,
leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, one of the two main Kurdish parties, “We want
to keep our peshmerga because they are a symbol of resistance...it’s not a matter to be
discussed or negotiated.”12 Other analysts note that Kurdish soldiers are most likely to
serve in northern Iraq and are reluctant to be publicly identified as taking a major military
role against Iraqi Sunni Arabs. According to Fareed Asasard, the director of the Kurdistan
Strategic Studies Center, “don’t think that because the peshmerga succeeded in Mosul,
they know Anbar [province]... I don’t think they would be successful in Fallujah or
Ramadi. Personally, I have never seen Samarra or Ramadi or Fallujah — but I have seen
Mosul.”13 
